ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the Global Information Grid (GiG) and Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) to support the U.S. military's operational concept of dominant maneuver and precision engagement must not be compromised or denied in combat or through the malicious activities of rogue states and individuals. Unfortunately, the inherent model of assumed trust in the legacy Internet has resulted in an explosion of viruses, worms, and other malware that has seriously disrupted personal, commercial, and military use. As a direct result of this assumed trust, current defensive approaches are reactive, and technologies such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and spam filters have been introduced to attempt to detect and defend against threats as they are discovered.
Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) or the US Government. This work was funded by DARPA under the following contracts: DE-AC04-94AL85000, N66001-08-C-2012, and N66001-08-C-2013. 978-1-4244-2677-5/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has initiated a program to develop an Intrinsically Assurable Mobile Ad hoc Network (IAMANET). The program goal is to design and develop a "clean-slate" approach for MANETs that will directly support integrity, availability, reliability, confidentiality, and safety of communications and data. Derived from the IAMANET system model shown in Figure 1 , the Phase I IAMANET program is developing two intrinsically Assurable Network Infrastructures (ANls) that incorporate security features into the network core to minimize network subversion opportunities and consequences. An ANI provides preventative security that protects and resists attacks rather than detecting and responding to attacks. Since an ANI may not prevent all cyber attacks, Secondary Defensive Subsystems (SDS) may still be needed to provide detect/response services such as hidden detection, traceback, and quarantine of malicious activity and attacks. These SDS may require obscurity if they rely on surprise, statistical analysis, or invisible logical redundancy. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the problems that we perceive in the Internet and some of the existing work in this area. Section III describes some "desired system features in an IAMANET". Section IV describes a model for the threats that IAMANETs must protect against. Section V describes the PIANO system, designed by BAE Systems, which emphasizes the notion of trusted networking. Section VI describes Zodiac, a system designed by Telcordia, that makes the Community of Interest (COl) a fundamental security primitive.
These five sections provide interlocking but independent views on the IAMANET design problem. Finally, we provide some conclusions about this work.
II. BACKGROUND
The success of today's Internet can be traced back to its original design principles, shown in Table 1 , which emphasized interoperability and performance [3] . However, those principles did not fully anticipate the Internet's current threat environment [4] [5] . The Internet architecture must permit distributed mana ement of its resources. The Internet architecture must be cost effective.
The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low level of effort.
The resources used in the Internet architecture must be accountable.
In particular, the ARPANET threat model did not anticipate cyberattack, infiltration, exfiltration, or malicious control. Distributed management was partially achieved, but a cooperative basis for most protocols makes IP-based networks vulnerable to insider threats. Another feature was easy host attachment, which was made possible with a "permit-by-default" access policy. While this property enabled distributed innovation (and priceless applications like the World Wide Web), it also allowed current plagues like botnets and distributed denial-ofservice attacks. Finally without improved accounting and accountability, malicious use of resources will remain anonymous and untraceable.
Related Work DARPA, National Science Foundation (NSF), and other organizations have recently begun "clean-slate" designs for next-generation networks which incorporate security as a guiding principle. Examples include Future Internet Design (FIND) [1] and Global Environment for Network Innovations GENI [2] . DARPA's IAMANET is focused on military tactical networks that present unique challenges.
Military networks are closed usercommunities with nominally cooperative users and constrained security and allowed-use policies. This simplifies some of the security problems, as compared with the Internet. The threat level is much higher, though, since the adversaries may be well-funded nation states. Finally, the wireless environment presents many challenges that dictate trade0 ffs between security, usability, and performance.
III. DESIRED SYSTEM FEATURES
The IAMANET Program postulated that the system features described in this subsection will be critical [8] . In addition to providing these system responses, an IAMANET design must also carefully balance ease of use, security, and performance.
Authenticate and Account for All Actions: Without some form of authentication and accountability, malicious use of resources remains anonymous and untraceable. With effective authentication and accountability, unauthorized users and attack traffic can be tracked inside the network, and not just at end hosts, thus ensuring that the attack originator can be identified precisely. In addition, squelching can happen close to the attack source.
Deny by Default: Military tactical networks are closed user communities with a limited set of allowed applications. So, a "deny-by-default" policy (e.g., all actions that are not explicitly permitted must be denied) is organizationally feasible. The postulated benefits would be: a) new threats/actions are often denied a priori; b) denial-ofservice attacks are harder to mount; c) "probing" is severely limited and easily curtailed; and d) anomaly detection is simplified due to the narrower scope of permitted actions.
Insider Threat and Byzantine Robustness: All systems have flaws in implementation and configuration. In addition, another nation-state can place both human and non-human insiders within our systems [9] . These implementation flaws and insiders can cause "arbitrary behavior" to occur at any MANET node.
Trusted Hardware: It is likely that some parts of an IAMANET node must be protected against life-cycle attacks by other nation-states. However, a design which posits that the entire IAMANET protocol stack is implemented in tamper-proof or trusted hardware will not pass muster because of cost and flexibility reasons. As such, an important design objective is to identify the minimal set of IAMANET features that must be deeply evaluated and implemented in trusted and/or tamper-proof hardware.
This threat model applies to both the physical domain (e.g., capture and damage) and the information domain (e.g., cyber attack and RF jamming). It also addresses the insider threat and Byzantine nodes. [5] chiefly concerns cyberattack in the information domain, including computer worms, pre-inserted malicious code, remote cyber intrusions, exfiltration, protocol exploits, misconfiguration, and infrastructure attacks, as well as halting and Byzantine failures. Byzantine failures, in contrast to halting failures, involve unexpected and possibly malicious behavior, extending to collusion between multiple subverted system elements. System designs should also consider vulnerabilities in the physical, cognitive, and social domains (see [6] ).
Strong
The simplified version of this threat model is that nodes can be destroyed, disabled or captured. Once captured, an adversary can use the system's features, protocols, and interfaces in an arbitrary manner intended to cause maximum disruption and damage to the remaining valid nodes. An adversary may also seek to insert "extra features" into our systems, via lifecycle attacks and insiders, that can be activated at a time/place that causes maximum disruption and damage.
For research purposes, this threat model can be abstracted as given in [7] with extensions for MANETs. With respect to the wireless channel, it is assumed an adversary can: 1) receive any signal transmitted over the common channel; 2) transmit any signal over the common channel; and 3) prevent any radio from transmitting or receiving. The adversary is also presupposed to have complete knowledge of the IAMANET architecture and protocols. So, the adversary will have the capability to: 4) create any information types that exist in the system; 5) act as an initiator or responder for any protocol in the system; and 6) perform any algorithms in the system, including cryptographic algorithms. These six capabilities do not require the adversary to be in physical possession of an IAMANET node. They also do not require the adversary to have valid authentication credentials within an IAMANET.
Due to the physical vulnerability of the IAMANET nodes, the adversary may also have: a) possession of valid authentication credentials for one or more nodes; b) permission to read or write any data stored on these nodes, except where that data has been stored in tamper proof hardware; and c) permission to interact with tamper proof hardware, at these nodes, through all available interfaces to that hardware. (Note: Item (b) means the adversary can add/delete software from the node except where that software is implemented in tamperproof hardware.) Protocol (SBGP) as well as the requirement for continued connectivity to a trusted key server.
Ubiquitous deny-by-default admission and access control throughout the network: Strict enforcement of strong accountability is performed throughout the network fabric. Pervasive admission and access control enforces policy at every node to prevent unauthorized network traffic from propagating more than one-hop from an adversary, and from entering or leaving the network from/to networked applications. Context-aware access control extends the usual notion of policy by adding support for conditional policy expressions and processing to provide adaptive control over resource usage, for example, as a function of Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO). Stateful access control further extends policy to provide explicit, holistic control over grouped traffic characteristics (e.g., aggregate bandwidth usage for QoS; connection rate limits for individuals/groups to counter SYN-based DoS attacks). PIANO technologies combine line-rate efficient filtering; fault-tolerant, automatic distribution of access policies; and group rekeying as a means for decentralized administration of role-based systems with privilege revocation. The goal of these integrated capabilities is to provide efficient operations while remaining agile to membership, topology, and environmental changes typifying MANETs.
While access control mechanisms protect against unauthorized access, they do not prevent authorized nodes from providing false information. Of particular concern is the propagation of network state information (e.g., neighbors, link capacities) critical for network operations. The PIANO architecture uses a unified K-hop verification mechanism that allows nodes to a) test state validity; b) compartmentalize state by source; and c) trace state errors back to their point of origin. Within PIANO, validity checking is treated neatly as another type of verification mechanism used by access control.
Data path parallelism with loss and corruption resistant coding:
Classical packet routing is vulnerable to attacks along the common forwarding path. Distributing traffic across multiple parallel disjoint paths provides Byzantine robustness and complicates exfiltration through wiretapping. By distributing the traffic load, this principle helps eliminate congestion hot-spots inside the network due to flood or DoS attacks. Yet, parallel paths also provide increased opportunity (i.e., more links) for an adversary to poison flows which may be mitigated through packet coding. While solutions like multipath routing with fountain coding may be applied, PIANO utilizes poisonresistant secure network coding (netcoding) algorithms that achieve both throughput and security gains over the baseline system while mitigating a wide range of common attacks from Jellyfish to Blackhole. Secure netcoding provides resistance to Byzantine failures for data as it transits the network.
A novel combination of strict service separation, resource monitoring and service communication specification checking by a reliable network service manager provides resistance to exfiltration, resource exhaustion, and failures of omission, modification, creation or injection of data. Multipath routing also realizes availability for data transmission; service reprovisioning realizes availability for data consumers and producers.
Data storage parallelism with attack and fault resistant discovery: Access to accurate and timely network management and control information as well as application data can be denied due to mobility-induced network partitioning, node failures and variety of cyber attacks. PIANO use of neighborhood and distributed hash tablebased dissemination protocols distributes redundancy encoded content across a collection of peers, providing resilience to missing peers and/or corrupted data stored in compromised peers in a way that is analogous to netcoding's use of multiple paths in concert with erasure codes. This Byzantine-resistant mechanism is an efficient means for providing intrinsically assured access to data in MANETs. In addition, PIANO's scalable peer-to-peer resource discovery algorithm leverages data replication to maintain resource location maps and to provide the means for nodes to discover and access resources and data.
Accounting for adversary influence in network performance monitoring: Estimated network performance metrics such as link-quality and available bandwidth are often inputs to networking protocols. Based on sensor measurements available to the node, control and estimation theory provide historical approaches to calculating accurate predictions.
These models are based on assumptions that external influences (such as noise) are without intent -i.e., they are not intentionally trying to subvert the estimation process. Yet, adversaries can indirectly influence the measurement process. PIANO's resilient estimation thrust reformulates the resilient estimation problem to develop estimation approaches that are robust against both environmental effects and adversaries.
PIANO Node Model
PIANO's concept of trusted computing concentrates on the key networking actors: node, link, traffic, and (to a lesser extent) applications and radios. Of these actors, the network node plays a critical role since it hosts the PIANO algorithms. In this section, we define a model of a network node, examine the vulnerabilities within that model, and then define the PIANO node model that addresses these vulnerabilities. This discussion is further organized along the five core research areas described in the previous section.
Implementations of networking services vary widely based on the underlying computer services and functional decomposition. The OSI layered model has served as the classical model for networking services. In the OSI model, networking services are partitioned along the lines of the communications services that they provide with each service building on the capabilities of the underlying services: data link focuses on one-hop connectivity; network focuses on multi-hop forwarding; transport provides end-to-end services. Recent research in crosslayer optimization has suggested that, while the OSI model helps support interoperability, it can limit performance. This suggests a different model may be required for the ANI to apply to existing and future networking services. A more suitable model for PIANO centers on the basic operations that network nodes perform. This is shown in Figure 3 . A classic networking node receives traffic from either the application or radio. If the traffic is from the radio, it is deserialized from its over-the-air format into an appropriate format suitable for processing by the Network Protocol (NP). The resulting message is placed into memory as the protocol determines what action to take. For example, the network protocol may collect information from the message, modify the message for forwarding, construct a new message, or pass elements of the message on to the application. To determine which action it should apply to the message, the network protocol examines its internal model of the relevant network conditions (Network State) and previous protocol events (Network Info). Network state information is provided by two sources: Estimation and Acquisition. Under estimation, the network protocol collects information from its sensors and estimates the network conditions of interest, such as local link-quality between two nodes. Under acquisition, the node collects estimates from other nodes in the network such as link-quality information to distant nodes. Supporting these services, Network Applications may provide additional services such as name resolution (e.g., DNS) and clock synchronization (NTP).
When considering the classic model, the security challenges identified previously become apparent. Some of these have been marked on the figure (left). Corresponding to each of these, PIANO (right) has introduced a mechanism from the core areas. Each PIANO-introduced mechanism is color-coded to correspond to the vulnerabilities that the mechanism addresses. The vulnerabilities and corresponding PIANO solutions are discussed below.
• Impersonation and Manipulation (~): In the classic model, manipulation of the packet in unprotected memory along with general access to the radio allows processes on the node to generate arbitrary messages. The adversary can therefore create false messages that appear to be from another identity (i.e., impersonate). The adversary can also modify packets in an effort to manipulate the system (i.e., manipulate).
One solution stems from trusted computing -only allow authorized processes to use the networking devices and curtain memory such that the memory of these trusted processes cannot be manipulated by other processes. While this approach can be applied to an ANI, it does not prevent an authorized process from creating falsified messages.
The PIANO architecture, shown in Figure 3 , combines a limited trusted hardware capability with strong identity services taken from the identity thrust. Trusted hardware is defined as a limited set of services and memory that is tamper-proof. Our approach provides generic access to the radio and packet construction but enforces strong accountability in the process. While the adversary is still permitted to construct and manipulate messages, their actions are tracked and embedded in any packet they send. By limiting the role of trusted hardware to packet manipulation, the PIANO architecture avoids placing all of its core technologies into a "safe" area.
• Exfiltration (~): Within the classic model, access to network services and applications are generally unmanaged. Firewalls are the common bolt-on approach to control access to services. While firewall services are successfully used today, their capabilities are hampered by the lack of strong accountability services, separation from the networking protocols, and emphasis on allow-by-default.
The PIANO architecture enforces access control within the protocol using a deny-by default paradigm and leverages the strong accountability services provided by the trusted hardware. Under deny-bydefault, the network's bias is toward security over interoperability. Additional details of deny-by-default access control and the required control signaling are described in [12] .
Under development is the placement of these services within a protocol. Current practice inserts the policy services at key exchanges within a protocol's implementation. Yet this requires analysis of each particular protocol's vulnerabilities which may result in poor enforcement.
As the model illustrates, enforcement at the edges of the trusted hardware may provide a common enforcement point. This is still under investigation.
• Network Modeling/Estimation (:Ia): Incorrect estimation of the local network environment can cause reduced performance or even catastrophic failure. For example, an adversary may manipulate packets within a TCP/IP flow such that a network node perceives congestion and backs off its rate. This attack is facilitated by the adversary's ability to distort the measurement process.
PIANO utilizes resilient estimation techniques to address this problem. Resilient estimation explicitly incorporates the adversary into the measurement process.
• Network Modeling/Acquisition (~): False estimation information from other nodes in the network can similarly affect performance. For example, an adversary may construct optimistic statements of his connectivity in order to redirect traffic flows into his node. Since the performance of the remote node may not be directly observable, this false information is accepted by the local node. Note that identity and deny-by-default services do not prevent these flows if the adversary is authorized to share these messages and is accountable for them.
Under investigation is the use of additional supporting signed evidence to detect if a report is falsified. The approach, called K-hop verification, and its integration into the architecture remains under development at the time of this paper's writing.
• Protocol Characteristics(:E>): Classical protocol design has developed practices that disproportionately grant influence to particular nodes. An adversary, located at these network locations, can execute attacks that have far greater operational impact than attackers at other locations in the network.
To provide Byzantine robustness to the data plane, PIANO is developing algorithms that "smooth" the traffic both temporally and spatially using a unified approach of network coding. Network coding provides natural support for multiple-path routing and cross-packet encoding that makes it suitable as a foundation for this principle.
• Network Applications (~): A key capability provided by many network applications is global data consistency. Queries, such as a DNS lookup, conceptually resolve to a single answer regardless of your location in the network. This distributed state information may be manipulated by an adversary.
PIANO provides a set of Byzantine robust services (CacheCoding) for disseminating and retrieving network state information. Jointly optimized with some of the current protocol improvements (in order to benefit from Byzantine robustness in the data plane), these services are currently the basis for the policy dissemination. 
VI. ZERO OUTAGE DYNAMIC INTRINSICALLY ASSURABLE COMMUNITIES (ZODIAC)
The Telcordia-Ied Zodiac project provides an alternative ANI architecture based on Dynamic Communities of Interest (DCoIs). Specifically, military operations are naturally segmented into communities that share common access to protected information and network resources. Yet today's Internet lacks direct support for "Communities of Interest" [8] and relies on bolt-on solutions to segment access. As illustrated in Figure 4 , the DCoI concept embodies the idea of dynamic fine-grained isolation and containment of network and application resources based on shared interests. Desired IAMANET features such as mandatory access control ("authenticate and authorize all actions" and "deny by default") can be recast as admission to a DCoI and management of partitioned resources.
Dynamic Communities of Interest
The Zodiac project centers on building DCoIs as the fundamental security and communications building block. A DCoI is a dynamic group of networked nodes whose membership, application, and resources are controlled by policy.
Looking at each of these points, it is important to emphasize that the DCoI is dynamic. In order to meet mission needs, communications needs, and security needs, communities of interest need to be able to be formed quickly and to be destroyed when no longer needed. DCoIs must be able to be created for every conversation, even the most ephemeral. If this were not the case, an attacker could avoid the enforcement mechanisms described below by conducting communications outside of a DCoI.
The DCoI has a group of nodes with a particular, managed membership list. This allows us to limit DCoI participants to those nodes that have a reason to have access to the information being passed within the DCoI. Operationally, this also means that users can ignore irrelevant communications. However, in keeping with the goal of being dynamic, Zodiac also allows nodes to join and leave (when authorized) as the need arises. The intent is to support scenarios where a user needs to join a DCoI, request some service, and then leave the DCoI.
Each DCoI supports only one application, which simplifies determining whether traffic is legal for that DCoI. Traffic carried in a DCoI is either the application traffic or control plane traffic such as routing updates for that DCoi. By limiting traffic in this way, it becomes easier to build "secondary defenses," such as statistical-and signaturebased intrusion detection, that determine whether any traffic stream is within the limitations imposed on a particular DCoI. This approach is also intended to limit the damage caused by a new "zero-day" exploit to only one application and to enable a rapid, clean re-start of that application once a compromise has been detected.
Finally, we use policy to tie these elements together. There are many elements of communication that need to be tailored to the needs of the communication mission. Elements such as the membership of a DCoI and the resources to be dedicated to a given DCoI can, in some cases, only be determined at the time the DCoI is created. The Zodiac Policy System is designed to allow the flexibility, and enforce the constraints, required by the network and mission configurations encountered in military tactical applications.
Principles Enabled by the DCoI Architecture
Based on the DCoI model, three mutually supporting principles are enabled by the DCoI architecture. These principles are described below:
Fine-grained containment strategy with per-DCoI keys, policies and resource allocations: Zodiac constrains all communications to a DCoi. Any traffic that is not validly part of a DCoI is dropped. This is true for control traffic as well as application traffic. Because packets are signed and encrypted using group keys, intermediate nodes can determine if a given packet was generated by a valid member of that DCoi.
This constraint extends into the nodes as well. When data is within a node, (whether originator, receiver, or forwarder) it is sequestered based on the DCoi. Data on a node can be shared among DCoIs, but that sharing is controlled by policy as enforced by system mechanisms. So, again, Zodiac is designing mandatory access control mechanisms that span both the hosts and their network interconnections.
The result of this principle is that communications are deny-by-default. In addition, all user actions can be authorized and authenticated within the context of a DCoI.
Legal communications are easily identified and distinguished from illegal communications. Additionally, this principle constrains the domain of policy actions making it inherent to describe the policy for this group of nodes, using this application, for this particular purpose. All of this combines to mean that attacks are narrowly constrained. Unless attack traffic behaves very much like legal communications, it is quickly identified and dropped.
Comprehensive hop-by-hop enforcement by each DCoI node: Our second principle is hop-by-hop enforcement.
Each node is individually responsible for enforcing the policies and mechanisms to secure itself, the DCoI, and the network. Because we are concerned about Byzantine nodes and insider attacks, Zodiac's hop-by-hop enforcement mechanisms help minimize the degree to which we have to trust the actions of other nodes. Zodiac's third principle (diversity) will also help minimize the impact of Byzantine nodes, as discussed further below.
Each node is authorized to examine each packet that it encounters and enforce relevant provisions of policy and mechanism. For example, a packet received for forwarding is examined to determine if it is being routed within a DCoI known to this node. If not, the packet is discarded so that we avoid using scarce resources to forward invalid traffic.
The relevant headers through the network layer are then decrypted within the context of the routing DCoI. 1 We then examine the headers to make sure that they conform to the policies set up for forwarding traffic in this DeoI. If this node also participates in the application DCoI, policy at that node determines whether to decrypt the payload to perform additional checks such as content filtering. Policy can specify that all packets are examined, that packets are probabilistically chosen for examination, or that no packets are examined. These three policies might correspond, for example, to a bandwidth restricted environment with strict security needs, a typical node, and a power-restricted node that forwards a significant volume of traffic. In the last case, the node must use the most extensive processing only for those packets destined to a local process at that node. 1 Zodiac maintains a hierarchy of DCols. If authorized by policy, a DCol can give packets to a parent DCol for transmission. In this case, the originating DCol is called the application DCol and the transmitting DCol is called the routing DCol. The reason this is allowed is to deal with cases where the members of the DCol do not have direct connectivity. A parent DCol with larger membership and fuller connectivity can be used to carty the traffic. Encryption is used to ensure that the payload and transport headers cannot be read by the routing DCol.
The results of this second principle are that trust of external nodes is reduced, helping to meet the threat of Byzantine and insider attackers. In particular, this gives us a distributed, redundant decision making structure that helps to minimize the chance that Byzantine attackers can capture a few key nodes and leverage them to control the network. The design intent is that attacks are caught early. Since many of our target environments run with constrained resources, this helps to limit the effect of denial of service attacks of various types. In addition, the goal is that successful attacks are limited to a single DCoI, which limits their mission impact and simplifies recovery.
Combining the first two principles, attacks must look very much like legal traffic, so hop-by-hop enforcement is examining narrowly constrained traffic. This simplifies the task compared with the Internet model. As an example, consider a statistical IDS in the Internet. It needs to compare a received packet against typical legal packets on the Internet. The behavior of traffic on the Internet is so broad that the false positive and false negative rates tend to be high. However, if all the application traffic is constrained to be VoIP within a DCoI, it becomes much easier to model the traffic for characteristics such as packet length, inter-packet spacing, and even data format within the packet. This further constrains attacks to look like legal traffic while decreasing the processing effort required to perform that examination. While this does not completely eliminate the potential for "zero-day" attacks, it does constrain their format and helps limit their impact.
Diversity of Services and Data:
Our final principle is diversity of services and data. Where possible, we provide services in a way that is distributed, redundant, or both. Thus, our Naming Service is built on distributed hash trees [11 ] . This ensures that naming records are distributed across multiple machines and that there are multiple sources for any record. Outages, whether due to loss of connectivity, attack, or node failure, merely require the user to request the data from another source. Similarly, nodes with high security requirements can request records from multiple servers, compare the results, and thus increase the number of nodes that would need to be compromised by an adversary to compromise the information. (Information in the Naming Service is also signed by the originator. This reduces the need for trusting the nodes providing the name service.)
Similarly, one element of our Routing Service is dispersity routing [10] . Packets are sent over multiple paths, with or without redundancy, it they exist. If a path has an outage for any reason, the remainder of the stream flows across the alternative routes.
If the traffic is being sent redundantly, the lost traffic can be recovered. If not, the receiver can notify the sender so that it can use a different path if the loss rate becomes unacceptable. Similarly, other performance parameters such as latency can be compared across the paths. If a path is underperforming whether due to attack or network conditions, it can be dropped or replaced. Indeed, in some cases, it may be difficult to distinguish adversarial actions from the normal RF impairments found in MANETs.
Generally, using diversity and redundancy also helps to reduce the trust required of other nodes. Byzantine nodes need to compromise a larger portion of the network in order to be effective in their attacks. Finally, normal failures in the network are also less likely to have a lasting negative effect on applications. 
Zodiac Architecture
As shown in Figure 5 , the Zodiac architecture is built from seven services. These provide the necessary basis for system security by controlling DCoI membership, negotiating encryption keys, distributing and enforcing policies, securely distributing names and other networking data, and controlling movement of data between DCoIs. On the host, each DCoI is contained within a virtual machine. This container architecture limits the damage that can be done if a DCoI is successfully attacked, protects DCoI data from processes in other DCoIs, and allows fast restart of corrupted DCoIs.
From Architecture to Security
Each of these elements is important to maintaining the security of the Zodiac network. Our security goals are based on the traditional taxonomy of confidentiality, availability, integrity, safety, and reliability. We consider each of these in tum and link them to the desired system features.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is required to prevent data exfiItration. We approach confidentiality by minimizing access to information to those that have a demonstrated authorization to access it and by minimizing access to even cyphertext from those without authorization. We encrypt all data on the network with DCoI-specific keys. Additionally, DCoIs are rekeyed as required.
Many of the policies used in practice can be confined to a single DCoI. This keeps information about resource allocations confidential to the members of that DCoI. Even for policies that need to be considered at a node level (for example, policies that allocate node resources common to all DCoIs, such as CPU usage), the policies are handled outside of the DCoI virtual machines in an isolated environment. Thus, the container architecture enforces separation of policy data.
This point relates to the role of virtual machines in isolating DCoIs from each other. Since each DCoI is in a container, processes in one DCoI cannot access data in another except as explicitly allowed by policy. This helps protect against the insider threat and limits the impact of a successful cyber attack to one DCoI.
Finally, dispersity routing causes different parts of each traffic flow to take different routes if they exist. This reduces the cyphertext available to an attacker who is eavesdropping along a subset of those routes. This helps protect against captured nodes and insiders.
Availability: The overall goal is to provide the missionrequired level of availability in the face of node/link failure irrespective of whether that failure is caused by environmental effects, insiders, cyberattack, or node capture/damage. Availability addresses Byzantine robustness as a subset of this larger design goal.
Dispersity routing is also important to providing availability. An attacker along one path cannot disrupt traffic along link-disjoint paths. By carefully selecting the degree of dispersity, the system can ensure the required degree of availability (assuming sufficiently rich connectIvIty in the network). Our use of geographic routing helps to ensure that we will find disjoint paths where they exist.
Redundant servers ensure that if a server fails due to network conditions or attack, there is the possibility that another server is available to users. Policy is used here, as well, to allow the mission planner to make the trade off between the overhead of additional servers versus the cost of losing a service.
Since we use QoS to limit the resources consumed by a DCol, this limits an attacker's ability to perform various types of denial of service attack. This, in tum, assures that the network is available, immediately, for critical traffic.
Integritv: Encryption and authentication of all communications ensures the integrity of received messages. This works in concert with authentication of DCol join requests so that only valid nodes can validly encrypt messages within a DCoi. This allows the system to "authorize and authenticate all user actions." Zodiac's novelty is the extension of this mandatory access-control concept to the hosts and their network interconnections.
Per-hop content filtering is also used to ensure that illegal content is caught early and is not passed through the network. It enables "deny-by-default" even in the presence of Byzantine nodes.
Safety: Because much of our configuration and policy is DCol-specific, errors have a much more limited effect. Only a single DCol is impacted. Additionally, because the policy for a DCol does not include policies for unrelated applications, debugging policy errors is easier than in traditional policy systems. Our goal is to be robust against both purposeful misconfiguration by insiders and configuration errors by trusted users.
Reliability: Zodiac's Host Services use a virtual-machine architecture to allow a low-overhead, clean restart mechanism.
Whether failure occurs due to attack, software fault, or other cause, this approach allows us to contain the failure to a single application and to restart that application, with its environment, much more quickly than in traditional systems. This improves the network's Byzantine robustness and "compromise resilience."
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented an overview of requirements and potential architectures for an IAMANET. Substantial elements of the proposed solutions will be expected to also have application in the wider Global Information Grid. A long-range IAMANET program goal is to scale the proposed solutions to larger networks.
